The U.S. health care system is ostensibly market based and therefore at least partially reliant on competition and consumer demand to regulate costs. Yet information about an essential feature of market transactions—costs—is typically obscure to patients until long after treatment. When discussing what must be disclosed for informed consent, the same list of required information is often mentioned regardless of the health care system in question, and information about costs rarely merits a place within this list. However, our assumptions about (...) what a moral principle requires need to be responsive to the realities of the health care system in which the principle is applied.This paper explores the moral foundations of disclosure and informed consent to argue that, in a market‐based system of the sort found in the United States, these same considerations support a requirement to disclose out‐of‐pocket costs before patients receive care. Next, I consider two objections to this view: first, that health care practitioners should focus solely on medical considerations in their encounters with patients and, second, that disclosing out‐of‐pocket costs would be too difficult to be mandated. I argue that medical and financial interests are inseparable within the U.S. health care system. If the difficulties in disclosing costs are deemed insurmountable, then the current system may prove unsustainable, both morally and financially, since we face the same practical impediments to implementing any meaningful consumer‐driven, market‐based health care reform. Finally, I explore some of the consequences of failing to disclose costs. The requirements of disclosing costs can be supported by the principle of respect for autonomy, regardless of the consequences, but in light of the consequences of the decision of whether to disclose, a concern about justice provides further support. (shrink)

Francis de Lorraine, an important Catholic military leader of the first war of Religion, is mentioned in two chapters of the Essays which relate his behaviour outside the siege of Rouen (I, 23) and during the battle of Dreux (I, 45). Montaigne compares the conduct of the Duke of Guise with that of Augustus, then with that of Philopœmen and Agesilaus, in two parallels based on borrowings from Seneca and Plutarch. The analysis of chapters I, 23 and I, 45 allows (...) us to grasp Montaigne’s judgement of this controversial figure and the way in which his assessment is elaborated in the mirror of ancient conflicts. The evocation of the battle of Dreux, if it justifies the temporisation of Francis de Lorraine, who did not engage while the Constable of Montmorency was in trouble, suggests the possible moral imperfection of an effective choice. The anecdote of the siege of Rouen, on the other hand, celebrates the virtue of an ineffective clemency, which did not allow the Duke of Guise to escape assassination but demonstrated his moral value and the strength of his faith. Although Montaigne therefore praises the qualities of the Catholic leader, the parallels do not obscure the gaps of a portrait that does not offer the details expected in a ‘life’, a narrative form praised in the Essays, and instead make the silences and uncertainties evident. (shrink)

The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis (...) implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes trans-temporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections. (shrink)

The presence of patients’ families during cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is a controversial topic, due to its repercussions for clinical practice. While family members’ presence may help them to overcome their grief, it could be detrimental, as it may case posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and there is the possibility that family members may interfere with the procedure. For these reasons, families’ presence during CPR has rejected by some healthcare providers.To research concerns about families’ presence among providers dealing with CPR in the (...) Fundación Hospital Alcorcón (Madrid), I performed this study. Of the 190 providers surveyed, 115 submitted a complete questionnaire. The most frequently reported concerns were interference (78.3 percent of respondents), and PTSD (69.6 percent of respondents). Fewer pediatric providers were concerned about PTSD than other providers (41.2% percent versus 74.5 percent, p = 0.01). Providers were reluctant to offer families the option of being present unless they had requested it, and would only permit it under certain conditions. Having a staff member to support the family was of great value to most respondents. The author believes families have a negative right to be present during CPR and so should be invited to stay. (shrink)

Proposals for health care cost containment emphasize high-value care as a way to control spending without compromising quality. When used in this context, ‘value’ refers to outcomes in relation to cost. To determine where health spending yields the most value, it is necessary to compare the benefits provided by different treatments. While many studies focus narrowly on health gains in assessing value, the notion of benefit is sometimes broadened to include overall quality of life. This paper explores the implications of (...) using subjective quality of life measures for value assessment. This approach is claimed to be more respectful of patients and better capture the perspectival nature of quality of life. Even if this is correct, though, subjective measurement also raises challenging issues of interpersonal comparability when used to study health outcomes. Because such measures do not readily distinguish benefits due to medical interventions from benefits due to personal or other factors, they are not easily applied to the assessment of treatment value. I argue that when the outcome of interest in value assessment is broadened to include quality of life, the cost side of these measures should also be broadened. I show how one philosophical theory of well-being, Jason Raibley’s “agential flourishing” theory, can be adapted for use in quality of life research to better fit the needs and aims of value assessment in health care. Finally, I briefly note some implications of this argument for debates about fairness in health care allocations. (shrink)

The principle of beneficence directs healthcare practitioners to promote patients’ well-being, ensuring that the patients’ best interests guide treatment decisions. Because there are a number of distinct theories of well-being that could lead to different conclusions about the patient’s good, a careful consideration of which account is best suited for use in the medical context is needed. While there has been some discussion of the differences between subjective and objective theories of well-being within the bioethics literature, less attention has been (...) given to the questions of what work a theory of well-being needs to do in bioethics and which standards of success ought to be used in selecting a theory of well-being for use in medicine. In this article, I argue that traditional theories of well-being developed in philosophy are not well suited to meet the needs of the medical context. For the principle of beneficence to be most useful, the underlying account of well-being should satisfy two conditions: first, it needs to lead to a concrete, action-guiding determination of the patient’s good; and, second, any recommendations it offers need to be justifiable to patients. Standard accounts of well-being have difficulty satisfying both conditions. Exploring the limitations of these theories when applied to treatment dilemmas helps point the way toward the development of an account of well-being better suited to healthcare. (shrink)

My education in political poetry begins with William Blake’s remark about John Milton in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.”1 The statement is usually taken as a charming misreading of Milton or as some sort of hyperbole. We find it lumped with other readings which (...) supposedly view Satan as the hero of Paradise Lost, such as Percy Bysshe Shelley’s in A Defence of Poetry, although neither Blake nor Shelley says anything of the kind.2I consider Blake’s statement simply accurate. I think it the best single thing anybody has ever said about Paradise Lost. If not clear as a bell, then at least as compressed as diamonds. The insouciant opening gesture takes for granted what to Blake is obvious” that the poetry qua poetry is better, more exciting, more energetic in the sections dominated by Stan, worse, duller, less poetic in the sections dominated by God. As a lover of poetry Blake has evidently struck a perplexity. Why does Milton’s Satan excite me and this God bore me even though he plainly intends me to adore God and scorn Satan? The answer could have been that Milton “wrote in fetters” where constrained by theology and the danger of lapsing into inadvertent sacrilege, but “at liberty” otherwise. Other critics have claimed that it is impossible to make God talk successfully in a poem, but the Book of Job is enough to refute that position. Why did Milton choose to make God talk at all? Dante cleverly avoided that difficulty.The second half of Blake’s sentence not only solves the Paradise Lost problem but proposes a radical view of all poetry which might be summarized as follows: All art depends on opposition between God and the devil, reason and energy. The true poet is necessarily the partisan of energy, rebellion, and desire, and is opposed to passivity, obedience, and the authority of reason, laws, and institutions. To be a poet requires energy; energetic subjects make the best material for poems; the truer the poetry, the more it will embody the truths of Desire. But the poet need not think so. He can be of the devil’s party without knowing it. 1. William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” Complete Poems, ed. Alicia Ostriker , p. 182.2. Let one instance serve: Marjorie Hope Nicolson wonders whether the members of the “‘Satanic School’ of Milton criticism” have read past books 1 and 2 of Paradise Lost . Alicia Ostriker, professor of English as Rutgers University, is the author of Stealing the Language: The Emergence of Women’s Poetry in America. Her most recent book of poetry is Imaginary Lover. (shrink)

The so-called Mind argument aims at the conclusion that agents act freely only if determinism is true. The soundness of this argument entails the falsity of libertarianism, the two-part thesis that agents act freely, and free action and determinism are incompatible. In this paper, I offer a new formulation of the Mind argument. I argue that it is true by definition that if an agent acts freely, either (i) nothing nomologically grounds an agent’s acting freely, or (ii) the consequence argument (...) for incompatibilism is unsound. I define the notion of nomological grounding, and argue that unless an agent’s acting freely is nomologically grounded, unacceptable consequences follow. I then argue that if agents act freely and the consequence argument is sound, a vicious regress ensues. I conclude by considering the libertarian’s dialectical options. (shrink)

I. On Philosophical Education To many philosophical sensibilities the expression “Pragmatic Naturalism” may sound like a sort of oxymoron. We have a good news: it is not. John Ryder’s new book The Things on Heaven and Earth will not persuade perhaps the most reluctant partisans of both sides, but it certainly shows how “pragmatic naturalism” is not necessarily a contradictio in adjecto, but rather an exciting theoretical approach. After reading this book, one acquires the confidence that prag...

This paper offers an analysis of the primary wrong of epistemic injustice, namely, of the intrinsic harm that constitutes its action itself. Contrary to Miranda Fricker, I shall argue that there is...

In recent years, so-called experimental philosophers have argued that participants in the moral responsibility debate ought to adopt a new methodology. In particular, they argue, the results of experimental surveys ought to be introduced into the debate.According to the experimental philosophers, these surveys are philosophically rel- evant because they provide information about the moral responsibility judgments that ordinary people make. Moreover, they argue, an account of moral responsibility is satisfactory only if it is tightly con- nected to ordinary judgments. The (...) purpose of this paper is to under- mine this argument. I will argue that experimental philosophers have not adequately acknowledged the distinction between metaphysics and conceptual analysis; they have not carefully distinguished what-it-is- to-be morally responsible from the concept of moral responsibility. I will draw this distinction, and then argue that metaphysicians qua metaphysicians may both ignore experimental data and offer an account of moral responsibility that satisfies the tight connection desideratum. (shrink)

Literature on epistemic injustice has grown tremendously as an increasingly rich and diverse body of work in recent years. From the point of view of intercultural and anticolonial discussions, contemporary contributions have also helped to illuminate how epistemic injustice and other forms of cultural domination might be related to essential processes within the structures of colonial and racial supremacy. -/- This proposal aims to contribute to such relevant and illuminating discussions by focusing on the role that language and culture might (...) have in phenomena of epistemic injustice, particularly, hermeneutical injustice. Despite the central role played by semantics in epistemic injustice studies, the question about whether certain languages could also themselves be the recipients of epistemic injustice has been rather undertheorized. Simultaneously, recent movements to advocate for minority language rights, such as the Linguistic Human Rights Movement (LHR), raise important questions in this connection. -/- In the present paper, I argue that attending to the intercultural context reveals a new sort of hermeneutical injustice, one that, surprisingly, has never been articulated before. In particular, I am referring to a kind of HI that is essentially “linguistic” and “culture-specific”. I will be presenting two different subtypes for this kind of hermeneutical injustice: The first concerns the possibility of considering certain languages themselves as genuine objects of hermeneutical injustice, while the second has to do with certain specific culturally-established expressions or forms of talking. (shrink)

This essay argues that Hobbes’s work as a translator was fundamental to his mature political philosophy. A proper appreciation for the significance of Hobbes’s lifelong engagement with the politics of translation clarifies both the relationship between Hobbes’s humanist and scientific work, and the meaning of his simultaneous critique and use of rhetoric in his political writings. Against the interpretation held by many scholars that Hobbes simply traded his early humanist interests for his mature political and scientific views, I demonstrate that (...) Hobbes was consistently concerned with the political instability generated by the vernacular translation of classical Greek and Roman texts. In responding to this instability, Hobbes developed his geometrical approach to speech while also, through his analysis of the relationship between translation and metaphor, finding ways to employ humanist rhetorical techniques consistent with this approach. Yet I show that Hobbes continued to rely on translation in areas of speech where he thought science alone could not provide persuasive answers. (shrink)

The present is characterized by the ontological crisis of the political subject and by the increasingly clear approach of radical political praxis to the libertarian thesis of rejection of the delegation of power and approach to direct action. Taking to the streets, assembly, direct action, individual insurrection, and daily resistance are some of the tools that characterize the new forms of resistance. However, where do these forms come from? This article aims to analyze the way in which poststructuralism, anarchism and (...) intersectional and decolonial feminisms act as a source of inspiration for these new forms of radical political resistance. (shrink)

_The following paper highlights the contradictions that exist in the understanding of water: it is considered a marketable resource over which one can exert power and, at the same time, a common good used by the planet’s species and ecosystems. Based on this, and after an analysis of several widespread ideas, the paper proceeds to describe the paradox in the perception of water as a product of an alienated aesthetics that makes it impossible to experience the after-effects of the Westernised (...) world. This lack of perception will be called _aesthetic omission_, corresponding to Eaton’s “nonperceivables” (2000). The text urges us to be aware that these kinds of aesthetics exclusions around water have global effects and ultimately determine the fate of life on Earth itself. Therefore, a complex revision of the established ontology of water is proposed in response._ _Keywords_: water; nonperceivables; aesthetics; epistemology; Earth. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore non-human multispecies interactions in soils polluted by electronic waste and subsequently bioremediated by plants and microbes. I argue that regenerative transformation in polluted soil environments is principally through microbial degradation, a significant process for survival amidst disaster. In doing so, I combine two separate research areas – the materiality of electronic waste and of soils – thus contributing to theorization on the persistent problem of anthropogenically polluted soils. I do so by examining the process of (...) bioremediation, which ties anthropogenic pollution with underground soil processes, notably those that occur at the soil interface surrounding plant roots, the rhizosphere. Using empirical examples from scientific literature on the bioremediation of electronic waste-contaminated soils in China, I demonstrate that degradation, symbiosis, and sequestration are instrumental processes in polluted soils. The micro-scaled perspective of these relational processes and their toxic alterlives contributes to materialist, chemosocial understandings of toxic and polluted environments. (shrink)

Humanistic management in a non-Western context is underexplored, for example, in Japan. Despite numerous publications especially on Japanese management in the 1980s to 1990s the topic of humanistic management in a Japanese context remains largely unexplored. Using Toyota as a case, this article illustrates how a company has systematically implemented Japanese ethical principles based upon Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Shintoism in its corporate ethics and operations. These moral philosophies emphasize self-improvement, social cooperation, and contribution to society as foundations for good (...) behavior regardless of an individual’s social position. We link some of these philosophic elements with humanistic management in an Asian context. In addition, we came to understand that Toyota’s organizational architecture, i.e., production system and product development rely on an integrated ethical system as their fundamental purpose of business activities, including an expectation that all workers collectively contribute to organizational success and harmony. This differs from many Western approaches which see profit as the purpose of the firm and view their ethical responsibilities in an ex-post fashion. These findings are important, as the scope of humanistic management practices globally needs to be expanded. (shrink)

The planet’s swiftly growing population coupled with the lack of food security and the degradation of natural resources has caused many demographers to worry about the ramifications of unchecked population growth while many philosophers worry about the ethical issues surrounding the methods of population control. Therefore, I intend to argue a system of encouraging a decrease in personal fertility rate via financial incentives offers a solution that is both viable and not morally reprehensible.

There is a very popular, very potent argument for the impossibility of undetermined free action---call it the naysayer's argument . The argument as I have formulated it is this: If an act is undetermined, it is impossible to account for the occurrence of that act. If it is impossible to account for the occurrence of an act, that act occurs by mere chance. If an act occurs by mere chance, that act falls under no one's control. If an act falls (...) under no one's control, that act is not free. Thus, if an act is undetermined, that act is not free. In this dissertation, I will delve into this argument, considering how the proponent of undetermined free action---the yeasayer---ought to respond. ;First, I will argue that in order to answer this question, one must reformulate the argument in terms of agent-controlled indeterminacy resolution . Once I have reformulated the argument in these terms, it will be clear that the yeasayer must respond to this argument by denying either: If an instance of indeterminacy resolution occurs, it is impossible to account for its occurrence. or If it is impossible to account for an occurrence, the occurrence occurs by mere chance. I will then consider which proposition the yeasayer ought to deny. ;I will argue that the yeasayer cannot refute the naysayer via a denial of and that he must deny . Indeed, he must affirm not only that there is a distinction between events that cannot be accounted for and those that occur by mere chance but that instances of agent-controlled indeterminacy resolution fall into the former category but not the latter. ;Once I have reached this conclusion, I will thoroughly explore the difficulties involved in affirming the thesis in question. I will argue that one's prephilosophical and metaphilosophical convictions determine whether one can reasonably affirm it. I will ultimately conclude that though the thesis is true, it is reasonable for the naysayer to deny it and, thus, that the naysayer cannot be refuted on his own terms. (shrink)

This article analyzes the functions and effects of direct democracy in Uruguay, especially in recent years. It studies the plebiscites and referendums that were actually carried out, and also those that were initiated but did not materialize because they did not achieve the necessary signatures or adhesions. The main objective of this research is to show that the mechanisms of direct democracy constitute an institutional way to channel and give voice to social discontent, contributing to avoid the democratic deficit and (...) the social outbreak. (shrink)

Aunque inicialmente la propuesta de A. Schütz resulta esclarecedora y sugerente, sin embargo, al proponer hablar de ámbitos finitos de sentido en lugar de realidades múltiples, se puede encubrir una posibilidad de mala interpretación del proyecto trascendental de la fenomenología. Ello estaría en función de la gran importancia que detenta en Schütz no sólo la actitud natural, sino el mundo de la “realidad práctica”. Me propongo plantear esta problemática a la luz del proyecto husserliano de fenomenología trascendental presentado en Ideen (...) I.Although initially the proposal of A. Schütz is enlightening and suggestive, nevertheless, on having proposed to speak about finite provinces of meaning instead of multiple realities, it is possible to conceal a possibility of bad interpretation of the transcendental project of Phenomenology. It would be depending on the great importance that holds in Schütz not only the natural attitude, but the world of the “practical reality”. I intend to raise this issue in the light of Husserls transcendental phenomenology project presented in Ideen I. (shrink)

This article proposes a reading of digital citizenships as these are shifting from a historical and conceptual perspective. We developed the following steps to carry it out: first, a problematization of the concept of digital citizenship from a critical-historical reading, betting on a complex understanding of it that assumes interactions between public and private spheres; second, taking into account aspects of the technology’s philosophy, we analyze the relationship between young people and politics through Twitter, and finally, a proposal of prejudices (...) configuration and modelling that can occur in this new public-private sphere based on some aspects seen in the second round of the 2018 Colombian presidential campaign. One of the conclusions we reached is that Twitter is a sociotechnical network that generates a shifting form of connection between the private and public spheres, where young people have assemblage and can generate resistance to the modelling imposed by political campaigns. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to analyse the Basic Vocational Training in order to better understand the significant segregation by sex that the data show, both in their access and in the specialties studied, based on the analysis of educational statistics. This analysis is complemented by the use of qualitative methodology through semi-structured interviews with 35 BVT students from five Valencian educational centres, an autonomous region with an important implementation of BVT. Theoretically, we start from Acker's consideration of educational (...) institutions as organizations with a gender mark that contribute to building hegemonic models of masculinity and femininity. The findings show the robustness of gender stereotypes are still identified that persist what we call gendered itineraries, which have an impact on educational decisions and future job transitions. (shrink)

From a certain point of view, mass tourism is undeniably part —and an expression— of contemporary acceleration. However, what we defend is that desire for difference —which originally nestles in the dream of traveling, before the appearance of the subject as tourist— responds to a desire for slowdown. In the time of pause and exception of the tourist experience, this desire acts as a generator of a symbolism —or an imagery— that seeks to preserve, protect, restore and promote difference, reality, (...) localness, past, tradition, folklore, nature, the other… beyond the —already insufficient— debate on authenticity. In this way, the importance of rescuing tourism from mere marketing could be shown, as well as to start to think about it from its relevance to humanities and its ethical commitment. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to elucidate whether and how the theory of erotic capital may function as a feminist tool to subvert the hierarchies and relations in current economy in favour of the empowerment and liberation of women. Thus, by analyzing the ways in which white, liberal feminism directly constructs its claims and petitions through the absorption of liberal epistemological dogmas, we intend to search the direct relation between the ideology developed by white, cisgender feminists and liberal economics (...) and politics. This article demonstrates how a theory of erotic capital does not lead to a feminist subversion of economy, but reinforces the liberal economic and political system that relies on a masculine and androcentric epistemology. The subjectivity that women can achieve through the exploitation of erotic capital is only as consumers and not as productive agents.El objetivo de este artículo es arrojar luz sobre si el capital erótico puede ser considerado una herramienta feminista para la subversión de las jerarquías y relaciones económicas y favorecer una liberación de las mujeres. Para ello, observaremos cómo el feminismo blanco y liberal, ha construido sus peticiones sin cuestionar los principios fundamentales de la economía liberal con el objetivo de demostrar la relación que existe entre el feminismo blanco liberal cisgénero y el sistema político-económico liberal. Este artículo demuestra que la implementación del capital erótico no conduce a una subversión feminista de la economía, sino que fortalece el sistema económico y político liberal que se fundamenta en una epistemología masculina y androcéntrica. La subjetividad a la que acceden las mujeres por medio del capital erótico es en clave de consumidoras. (shrink)

The present paper argues that the standardised treatment of disaster research and practice perpetuates the production of systematic epistemic injustices against victims of disasters. On the one hand, disaster victims are often prevented from contributing with their opinions and knowledge to the processes of disaster mitigation and disaster conceptualisation. On the other hand, disaster victims tend to lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of their experiences intelligibly, due to the existence of significant hermeneutical gaps in the hegemonic terminology on (...) the matter. I argue that both forms of epistemic injustice, the testimonial and the hermeneutical, are sustained by an epistemic privilege between the Global North and the Global South in matters of disasters. The second group comprises what I categorise generally as ‘disaster victims’. I identify two forms of structural prejudice that operate against disaster victims: one is the ‘non-expert’ prejudice, and the other is the colonial prejudice. Finally, because of the intercultural nature of disaster environments, I discuss the field of ‘multicultural competencies’ as a useful form of unveiling and counteracting the epistemic injustices contained in both disaster theory and practice. (shrink)

Bigenderism maintains there are only two genders, which correspond with the two sexes, male and female. Basic bigenderism requires that legal documents and public institutions designate a single invariant gender (that is, sex). Strict bigenderism applies these categories in a social context that stigmatizes "imperfect" men and women who do not reach ideals set by the bigenderist schema. I discuss these concepts and their implications, present three models that successively weaken bigenderist assumptions, and argue for the most radical of the (...) three. (shrink)

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all (...) cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms. (shrink)

Robots are simultaneously real machines and technical images that challenge our sense of self. I discuss the movie Ex Machina by director Alex Garland. The robot Ava, played by Alicia Vikander, is a rare portrait of what could be interpreted as a feminist robot. Though she apparently is created as the dream of the ‘perfect woman’, sexy and beautiful, she also develops and urges to free herself from the slavery of her creator, Nathan Bateman. She is a robot created (...) along the perfect dimensions as a Vitruvian robot but is also a creature which could be interpreted as a human being. However, the point I want to raise is not whether Ava’s reaction to robot slavery is justified or not but how her portrait raises questions about the blurred lines between reality and fiction when we discuss our robotic future. A real version of Ava would not last long in a human world because she is basically a solipsist, who does not really care about humans. She cannot co-create the line humans walk along. The robots created as ‘perfect women’ today are very far from the ideal image of Ava. They are sexist, primitively normative and clearly ‘wax-doll machines’. So though Ava’s dimensions are perfect she, like the Vitruvian Man, remains a fiction. In real life, however, we may have to deal with an increasing solipsism stemming from people engaging with machines like sex robots. In this case, it is human and not robotic solipsism we need to worry about. (shrink)

This essay begins by noting that “the question of the animal” has been abandoned prematurely in the current theoretical landscape in favor of the Plant, the Stone, the Object, and a more general rush toward Materialism and Realism (in their various permutations). The latest iteration of this economy of knowledge production (and planned obsolescence) may be found in the ubiquitous discourse of “the Anthropocene.” While it is a large and diverse body of thought and writing, I will focus here on (...) Bruno Latour’s influential rendition in Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime. I share Latour’s reservations about the concept of the Anthropocene, and I also share his desire for a more complex understanding of Gaia as an “outlaw” whose alterity pushes back against traditional concepts of nature as a totalized and homeostatic order. As I will show, however, Latour’s Actor Network Theory is far too blunt a theoretical instrument to account for the radical difference between qualitatively different orders of complexity and causation that obtain in biological vs. physical systems, which is crucial, of course, for understanding the role of the biological in the larger domain of Gaia and climate change. As I will show – drawing principally on the work of Stuart Kauffman and his proposition that the evolution of the biosphere is neither non-ergodic nor governed by entailing laws – the real “outlaw” (to use Latour’s language), when it comes to the evolution of the earth and its climate system, is the contingency and recursivity of autopoietic biological systems, which enable a form of downward and distributed causality, and a “decoupling” between micro- and macro-levels (to borrow Alicia Juarrero’s phrase), in which the alterity and negativity of temporality (hence my emphasis on “dynamic”) is irreducible and “creative.” We see this both ontogenetically and phylogenetically (as in the example of niche formation in ecosystems). In short, biology is not (only) physics – far from it. Why is this important? Because, after decades of hegemony by the neo-Darwinian reductionist paradigm, with its infatuation with the genome as the “book of life” and its subsequent engineering paradigm for biological existence, it is crucial to formulate an anti-reductionist, interdisciplinary framework for understanding the real complexity of life on the planet and its evolution. Here, however – as I argued in What is Posthumanism? – the issue isn’t just what you are thinking (the decentering of the human and humanism that Latour and I both share) but how you are thinking it. Here, Latour’s work has a desire, but no theory, for the alterity we both seek. At this crucial epistemic moment, we need, in short, an anti-reductionist anti-reductionism – not flat ontologies, but ever more “jagged” ones. (shrink)

This paper assesses a recent criticism of Michael Polanyi’s account of the origin of complex entities by Alicia Juarrero. According to Juarrero, Polanyi took higher-level complex entities like machines and organisms to come into existence through the imposition of external, top-down forces. This paper argues that while Polanyi took the emergence of machines to come about in such a way, Polanyi’s reading of 19th and early 20th-Century experimental embryology indicates his position is more sophisticated. Polanyi appears to have thought (...) a synthesis was possible between reductive-mechanical and holistic-vitalistic approaches in embryology and he appears to have relied on this synthesis in his account of the origin of complex organisms. While I argue that this synthesis is unclear, it suggests that Polanyi conceived of the emergence of organisms as the result of internal, complex, and non-deterministic processes. (shrink)

The kind of theological schools that prevail in the US today emerged as hubs of networks of voluntary societies in the early national period. Through a brief history of Lyman Beecher and Lane Theological Seminary, I show both the power of these networks of voluntary associations to connect free individuals and their role in the project of white Protestant settlement. Now every part of those networks is eroding. Critics who blame this erosion on narcissistic individuals understate the individualizing powers of (...) neoliberal orders. We cannot scold people back into community. Instead, we should begin with ideals that exist, in however ideological a form, in the present. Drawing on thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Ulrich Beck, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, bell hooks, Alicia Garza, and Rowan Williams, I argue for a critical redemption of “authenticity” that could reorient theological schools and renew forms of sociality to which they are connected. (shrink)

Judith Butler’s 2021 essay “Bodies That Still Matter” offers a compressed rehearsal of themes and moves that are developed in more detail in their 2020 book, The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind. In both projects, Butler spotlights the term feminicidio as an instructive indicator of brutality and violence against feminized individuals, including trans women. Feminicidio exemplifies the violence of “unequal grievability” that Butler’s recent work seeks to overcome; therefore, in particular relation to their recent work on nonviolence, Butler insists (...) that the horror of feminicidio should be closely linked to analysis that mobilizes against the full social force of the crimes. Following the work of Montserrat Sagot, Butler calls for analysis that links the brutality of the killings with a structure of social domination and terror. Additionally, Butler introduces questions for further exploration about representation, social organization, and the relation of sexual terror to domination, extermination, or a general theory of sexuality and violence. In this article, I make a start on the set of questions that come along with the term feminicidio in the work of some of its key theorists such as Diana Russell, Marcela Lagarde, Monserrat Sagot, and Alicia Schmidt Camacho. Here, in support of Butler’s claim that feminicidio should be analyzed in ways that mobilize comprehensive resistance, this article (1) defends Lagarde’s definition of feminicidio as an institutionalized crime, especially against Russell’s objection; (2) develops Sagot’s analysis of femicide in relation to Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics, (3) considers Schmidt Camacho’s critique of the term in the context of maquiladora labor in Mexico, and (4) excavates the salience of Foucault’s concept of biopower as an important model for Butler’s analysis. Finally, this article (5) argues that Butler’s work challenges nonviolence researchers to expand their interest and understanding of grieving as a form of resistance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 65-76 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Identity, Aesthetics, ObjectsGustavo GuerraIn September 1990 UCLA's Wright Art Gallery opened an exhibition entitled Chicano Art: Resistance and Affirmation 1965-1985 (now usually referred to as CARA). While CARA was one of several national events displaying nonmainstream art, it was also distinctive in its politics of self-representation. The artists participating in CARA insisted that they be described as (...) members of a Chicano art movement. With the term Chicano they hoped to step beyond labels preferred by the dominant culture—labels such as Mexican American, Latino, or Hispanic. For these artists, the word Chicano was appealing because it represented a complexity of meanings that they understood as being integral to both their identity and to the art they produced. The word Chicano, as Alicia Gaspar de Alba discusses in Chicano Art Inside/Outside the Master's House,1 embraces multiple meanings and axes of cultural identity; it derives from the Nahuatl pronunciation of Mexicano, often referring to a person of Aztec descent but including, as well, Native American heritage, Mexican roots, and Catholic faith. The CARA artists also embraced the label's association with a politics of liberation, popular protest, and working-class creativity. From the outset, then, the CARA exhibition was more than an art exhibition.By some lights, however, CARA was too much more than an art exhibition. When the organizers realized they needed funds, they applied for a National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH) grant and were initially turned down. While an NEH rejection might mean a number of things, the language of the rejection reports in this case narrows the possibilities down [End Page 65] to an issue that I mean to consider in this article. One rejection report states thatThe panelists understood that Chicano art arose from a variety of political movements and social causes, and therefore the political aspect of this proposal is appropriate to the subject matter.... Even so, the panelists worried that the project makes a political statement, that it is politics masquerading as culture, and that the proposal contains jargon and rhetoric and reads like a manifesto. 2Other reviewers objected to the general language of the report along similar lines. While Chicano artists made a point of representing themselves in complex, multidimensional terms, the NEH found such complexity and multidimensionality perplexing and thus their art not worthy of funding. One referee, for instance, claimed that the terminology used in the proposal was too narrow; he complained that defining Chicano in terms of struggle was too restrictive and excluded other Chicano artists for whom struggle was not a major concern. But later the same reporter objected that some of the concepts in the proposal were not inclusive enough, as they failed to include issues and topics that are central to the Chicano community. Thus the complexity and cluttered characterization that the artists felt was central to their sense of identity was dismissed as either too excessive or as too restrictive. According to the NEH, Chicano artists failed not because of their art (which the referees did describe as "visually compelling") but because of the way in which they chose to identify themselves—because, in other words, of their "rhetoric and jargon." Whatever it was that the NEH found compelling in the Chicano art they found uncompelling in the description of the Chicano artists' lives.After the organizers revised their proposal and reapplied for the grant, they were once again turned down. This second rejection highlights even more clearly the nature of the problem. This second report argues that "[T]here is a disjunction between the organizers' intentions and the exhibition. The proposal does not differentiate clearly between Chicano art and Hispanic art and, in its dependence on self-referential analysis rather than a comparative perspective, the exhibition does not place art in the bigger picture." 3I would like to consider what is at issue when descriptions of identity are said not to work, or when descriptions of art are likewise accused of failure and... (shrink)

There are potentialities to be harnessed in a fusion between elements of Alicia Juarrero’s views and a Polanyian framework. In this brief response piece, I address the latent Polanyian dimensions of Juarrero’s ontic approach to dynamical systems.

Retractions have traditionally been reserved for correcting the scientific record and discouraging research misconduct. Nonetheless, the potential for actual societal harm resulting from accurately reported published scientific findings, so-called information hazards, has been the subject of several recent article retractions. As these instances increase, the extent of support for such decisions among the scientific community and lay public remains unclear. Undergraduates (Study 1) and federally funded researchers (Study 2) reported their support for retraction decisions described as due to misconduct, honest (...) errors, or potential information hazards. Participants supported retraction on the former two grounds more than the latter. Despite limited support, women remained more receptive to retractions based on information hazards. Activist tendencies additionally predicted undergraduate men’s receptivity. Receptivity toward retraction due to information hazards was unrelated to scientists’ engagement in activism, suggesting that formal scientific training affords researchers an ability to separate personal and professional values in scientific discourse. Findings could inform the development of educational materials that may aid less experienced scientists and the lay public in understanding retraction ethics. (shrink)